I would usually tend to agree with that, I was mainly just responding to the specific claim that OpenPGP doesn't have a definition of a well-formed packet sequence, which is false.
Also, as a maintainer of OpenPGP.js, I'd say that while the complexity of OpenPGP certainly didn't help, quite a lot of things needed to go wrong to create this vulnerability:
- The message grammar validation was incomplete, as mentioned
- The streaming decryption/validation code affected how the packet sequence was processed
- A later optimization when not streaming affected it further in a way that caused an inconsistency in which packets were being read when
- Finally, the architecture of the code made it possible to return different data than what was verified, which should not have been possible (and we'll address this as well in a future refactor)
All in all, I would place more of the "blame" on OpenPGP.js rather than OpenPGP. That being said, I don't think placing blame is the most important here; both OpenPGP.js and OpenPGP should and will learn from this.
What you're seeing me and 'woodruffw implying is that modern formats are (deliberately) trivial to parse. OpenPGP is not. That is a security design feature that OpenPGP lacks, and it's a big one, because it's caused multiple issues already.
Yes, I understand and never said I disagree with that :) I'm just trying to provide some nuance and background about the specific issue discussed in this submission, as IMHO I think it's more interesting than making the same high-level points about OpenPGP over and over in every thread related to it (no offense meant, of course).