> under what definition of software engineer?
Probably a broad enough definition to net the US Government the greatest tax revenue possible for the effort to enact this.
They want the change to _seem_ like it will bring in revenue so the CBO number adding to the deficit is lower.
The folks advocating for this could care less about the deficit, but they need to act like they care.
IDK if that's right. Oddly, the current administration has gutted the IRS and seems pretty ambivalent about collecting taxes that are on the books. I wonder if there will be an inconsistent definition of who is a software engineer, based on how friendly the company is with the administration, whether the company still has someone with a DEI title, etc.
Judging by the Big Law shakedown, enforcement will be based on how much of your corporate cash is held in Taco’s shitcoin.
> the current administration… seems pretty ambivalent about collecting taxes that are on the books. I wonder if there will be an inconsistent definition of who is a software engineer, based on how friendly the company is with the administration, whether the company still has someone with a DEI title
So basically the same situation that we have with bullshit speed limits everywhere.
If we had specifically defunded highway patrol that was net-revenue-positive, yes.
Republican defunding of the IRS is literally insane: reform by cutting enforcement.
- It rewards people who cheat on their taxes.
- It costs the government more money that it saves, because IRS investment is net revenue positive.
But then, the modern Republican party seems more concerned with being the party of 'law(s I agree with) and order (for people who aren't me).'
People greatly overestimate the amount of material cheating that happens, especially among large companies and the wealthy. I used to work for a Federal audit organization and almost all of the recoveries had a root cause in sloppy compliance and record-keeping practices rather than intentional malfeasance. It is broadly recognized as optimal that the recovered money should be several-fold the direct costs spent to recover it because this activity incurs a lot of non-obvious indirect costs. It is a variation on the principle that the optimum amount of fraud is non-zero.
Most of the blatant tax fraud is much lower down the economic ladder because below a certain threshold recovery doesn’t justify the cost and people know this. The amount you can get away with is far below the threshold where it would be worth the risk for wealthy parties. The best ROI for auditors in many of these cases is to make regular object lessons at random to discourage it rather than systematically prosecute it.
AFAIK, the increased spending at the IRS did not lead to concomitant offsetting recoveries. This is a predictable outcome, the amount of enforcement activity has been pretty finely tuned for decades to optimize ROI. Most of the recoveries come from changing focuses on compliance to areas that haven’t seen much enforcement activity in many years. Fighting entropy basically.
If you assume that most large recoveries are from sloppiness rather than systematic tax fraud, it changes what is going to be an effective strategy.
>AFAIK, the increased spending at the IRS did not lead to concomitant offsetting recoveries. This is a predictable outcome, the amount of enforcement activity has been pretty finely tuned for decades to optimize ROI. Most of the recoveries come from changing focuses on compliance to areas that haven’t seen much enforcement activity in many years. Fighting entropy basically.
AFAIK, all the data shows exactly the opposite.
https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2023/07/turns-out-irs...
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p5901.pdf
(There are many more studies from various outside organizations, as well as other non-partisan government bodies outside the IRS concluding similarly)
These are studies designed to show positive results, and are susceptible to the criticism the parent identified.
IRS enforcement has diminishing returns because the IRS starts with the small minority of people who are very obviously cheating on their taxes. Those people get audited and the IRS very easily recovers money from them. If you want to audit more people than that, you have to audit people who are less likely to be cheating. The more people you want to audit, the lower the collections rate gets.
But if you're averaging in the recovery rate from the people who are so obviously cheating, you can get quite far down the road past a marginal benefit before the average becomes a negative number.
Meanwhile, even that isn't considering the indirect costs. The IRS spends $1 and recovers $2, but audits are much cheaper than the IRS than they are for taxpayers. So the IRS spends $1 and the taxpayers (many of whom did nothing wrong, because we're talking about averages here) have to pay $5, in order for the IRS to recover $2. That's quite bad -- $6 is being spent in order to recover $2, but it's being reported as a $1 net gain.
And it's worse than that, because those $6 aren't just money, it's actual spending -- human labor hours that couldn't be allocated to something else -- so what you're losing isn't the cost of that labor, it's the value of that labor. Someone was being paid $1 to create $2 in value but now instead of doing that they have to spend that time on an audit, so the $6 in cost is actually $12 in lost value.
Not accounting for things like this makes it seem like we should be spending a lot more resources on something with diminishing returns and large hidden costs.
The criticism the parent identified has almost nothing to do with these studies. It was that there is an equilibrium point where enforcement is counterproductive, but it did not identify anything about where that is or how that point relates to where we are.
At some point it gets to that level, but all of these studies show it is extremely far from that at present. This is also not at all what the IRS has been advocating going after.
The extremely cheap (for the IRS) audits you are talking about are the ones they have been doing for years because they can afford to. The tax situations are simple so don't require significant resources to audit. These are also the situations the original comment was talking about. The IRS and others have been advocating for years for the resource to go after actual tax cheats of wealthy individuals and corporations, whose tax situations are (intentionally) so complex that it is a serious investment to audit. Once you do audit them however, their tax dodging decreases for years into the future. This costs the employees and financial advisors dedicated to dodging taxes money.
The "hidden costs" you are so concerned about here, in many cases cannot be argued to exist. The people that would spend time defending violators are otherwise fully employed doing the opposite... coming up with ways to get around the taxes their employers or customers are supposed to be paying. Instead of costing $2, that comes out as getting yet another $2 out of that audit by distracting a societal parasite.
> The criticism the parent identified has almost nothing to do with these studies.
The criticism the parent identified is that the cost to the IRS is not the total cost to the public (i.e. innocent taxpayers being audited despite making only honest mistakes or having done nothing wrong at all), which is exactly a problem with these studies. To know where the equilibrium point is, you have to take into account these other costs, and the studies fail to do that.
> The IRS and others have been advocating for years for the resource to go after actual tax cheats of wealthy individuals and corporations, whose tax situations are (intentionally) so complex that it is a serious investment to audit.
What's really going on here is that those are the taxpayers it isn't as cost effective to audit because they have sophisticated lawyers, so they're much less likely to be violating the law. They're doing something which is complicated and then paying very little in taxes, but the complicated thing they were doing is legal so you can't get anything from auditing them. Meanwhile auditing them costs a lot because it's so complicated, so the ROI of doing it is pretty bad.
In particular it's worse than the ROI of auditing other taxpayers who can't afford such expensive lawyers and therefore are more likely to have made a mistake that allows the IRS to collect. But auditing those people makes the IRS much less sympathetic, because those people aren't the billionaires and the money the IRS collects is mostly a result of honest mistakes.
> Once you do audit them however, their tax dodging decreases for years into the future.
The assumption is that they were doing something unlawful to begin with, and then you're talking about the non-billionaires again.
Moreover, what really happens is that the people who made mistakes learn to hire tax lawyers. And then if you audit them again it comes up clean, but that doesn't mean they're paying more in taxes, because tax lawyers are pros at finding legal ways to avoid taxes, so what you've really done is encourage them to hire the people whose primary job it is to minimize tax revenue.
> The people that would spend time defending violators are otherwise fully employed doing the opposite... coming up with ways to get around the taxes their employers or customers are supposed to be paying. Instead of costing $2, that comes out as getting yet another $2 out of that audit by distracting a societal parasite.
It is definitely not the case that the number of tax lawyers and accountants employed is unrelated to the number of audits the IRS does. The more they do, the more business there is for those professions and the more people enter them. These are people who could have been doing something else and, moreover, people who consumed the resources that someone else could have used to do something better.
If you want to account for the social cost: moral hazard.
Who pays taxes when it's well known that the IRS doesn't audit and follow up on tax cheats?
Especially, if all it takes to further dissuade them is engineering complex wealth structures and keeping tax lawyers on retainer.
> Who pays taxes when it's well known that the IRS doesn't audit and follow up on tax cheats?
But they do. They always have. The question is, once they've done that, should then they proceed to audit an even larger number of mostly innocent people, because a small percentage of them did something wrong and finding that small percentage would cover the costs of the IRS, but not any of those other innocent people?
> Especially, if all it takes to further dissuade them is engineering complex wealth structures and keeping tax lawyers on retainer.
This is an entirely different problem. The ones with sophisticated lawyers aren't actually violating the tax code. The problem there is that the tax code is so complicated and poorly considered that fancy lawyers can find ways to avoid taxes without violating the law.
If you have been found to be cheating on your taxes, you should pay a fine that covers the cost of the audit.
They already have that. The problem is, in order to find someone who is actually cheating, they have to audit a lot of innocent people, and who is covering the cost of those audits when they don't find anything?
> the amount of enforcement activity has been pretty finely tuned for decades to optimize ROI
And then cut by 20% by the current adminstration [0].
I'd phrase the question of auditing lower income filers vs higher income filers differently -- do you think people with higher incomes should feel safer about cheating on their taxes?
Because average recoveries do scale with income [1]; unsurprisingly, it seems wealthy people commit tax fraud too [2].
While catching the low-hanging fruit (and therefore better ROI) is one goal, it needs to be balanced with ensuring there are similar levels of compliance (or penalties where it's lacking) in higher income payers.
[0] https://taxpolicycenter.org/taxvox/cuts-spending-and-staff-d...
[1] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/06/05/upshot/tax-audits-wealthy...
[2] https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/irs-launches-new-effort-aimed-a... https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/irs-tops-1-billion-in-past-due-... https://www.foxbusiness.com/politics/yellen-touts-irs-enforc...
Whats your view on Cum-Ex?
And maybe as a Bonus what do you make of the smaller (relative) taxrate the bigger fish (companies/wealthier individuals) pay?
I’d think it’s normal and expected that the “mistakes” made will err on the side of benefiting the taxpayer, i.e., reducing their tax bill.
This comment (currently downvoted to hard-to-read grey-on-grey) is an excellent example why you should always enable "showdead" in your profile, use user CSS to make downvoted comments readable again (e.g., https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=41514726), and browse https://news.ycombinator.com/active instead of the homepage once in a while.
What's really going on here is that this provision was part of the tax acts from the first Trump administration. Due to procedural rules in Congress, they had to make those cuts appear revenue neutral over a 10 year time period. This tax increase is part of that. Very likely nobody involved really had a reason or cared that SEs get categorized this way, it just let them pass the changes they really wanted at the time.
A sufficiently idiotic tax scheme such as Section 174 can destroy far more income tax revenue than it collects, by destroying jobs and small businesses, and knocking high earners down a tax bracket or three. Section 174 isn’t doing much to tax FANG companies. Apple has all their profits in their Double Irish Dutch Sandwich racket. Amazon cooks the books to appear unprofitable on paper, in a manner that would make Hollywood accountants blush.
This really only hurts the competition, who is completely unprofitable in every sense of the word. And all for what? Left-shifting the collection of a 21% income tax by a couple years? I think many of us would’ve done terrible things in 2021 to only have an effective tax rate of 21%. The government mugged Peter the payroll tax man to pay Paul the corpo tax man, but they disemboweled Peter in the process, and most of the money had to be disposed of as a biohazard.
I don’t believe Section 174 was an honest attempt to manage the deficit. I think Zuck, the PayPal Mafia, and the blood-boy cabal bribed some Congresscritters to kill off what remained of their competition.
> I think Zuck, the PayPal Mafia, and the blood-boy cabal bribed some Congresscritters to kill off what remained of their competition.
What's with the craze for finding conspirational incentives?
There's a repeatable pattern where commenters hallucinate an unreasonable incentive for everything.
Motivations are difficult to discern (see courtrooms), and it is a modern vice to try and analyse incentives, but too often the cause-and-effect imaginations are not even reasonable guesses, but are just pure fiction.
My best guess (based off word choices made) is that we all love to create new stories/narratives, that fit into our personal tribal stories.
My best guess is that legalizing corruption has made everyone a bit more deranged. Some more than others.
I don’t think it’s such a huge leap that a policy with such unanimous opposition was put in place by the select few special interests who benefit from it. It helps (or doesn’t help?) when they all got together for that photo op at the inauguration.
Believing in corruption doesn't have to be in the same league as believing the moon landings were faked. I don't particularly think this tax thing is something other than short-sightedness, but there is a tendency among some to dismiss even blatant cases of corruption.
Believing in fake moon landings requires believing in a level of competence I don't think exists in large organizations, but the same applies to believing there is no corruption or backroom deals, which are exposed all the time and seemingly rarely punished.
It’s much simpler than that. People have figured out that if you follow the money (ask who profits financially or in terms of market power), then even confusing political actions make sense.
Uh have you worked in policy in faang? I have that would be the least insane tactic I saw used.
I can’t believe you’re trying to claim the high ground in rationalism here and have no clue how bad it is.
No, but clearly you also have zero idea.
People in policy are not dealing with bribery and corruption (which is the framing of the comment I replied to).
If bribery is occurring, then I would expect it to be used to get higher value personally directed outcomes (not a few percent on the bottom line). The suggested incentives sound completely wrong to me (which is the point of my comment). Obviously my own ignorant opinion given that I have zero experience "bribing Congresscritters".
I can believe there is corruption, but I also believe smart people will hide their goals better than the internet peanut gallery assume.
Several heads of policy directly attend trumps fundraisers currently. Are You kidding me it’s not even covered up anymore.
What I’m saying is you in your not doing this mentality think this is fine all cloak and dagger.
It isn’t. It’s legal and it’s done very directly.